The military strength of the Song Dynasty was not bad. The reason why the military competition with Liao at the beginning of the founding of the country could only tie the game but could not achieve the strategic goal of "recovering Yanyun" was because Liao itself was already a major country that was basically on the same level as the Central Plains civilization (this development trend began in the middle of the Tang Dynasty. At that time, East Asia experienced a process of a general improvement in the level of civilization of various ethnic regimes and gradually becoming a coherent state. Liao's founding and development were the concentration of this trend.

It reflects that many military mistakes made by the Northern Song Dynasty in the battle against Liao were not the familiar "separation of soldiers and generals" and "fighting under the formation map" that many people now know. On the contrary, it was precisely because the division of troops did not listen to the command of the central government to make progress. This was also the continuation of the military atmosphere of the Central Plains since the late Tang and Five Dynasties, which was brave and light in fighting and adventurous, rather than the so-called "poverty and weak" and "Song Taizu did not hesitate to weaken the military's combat effectiveness in order to maintain the throne."

The reason for the demise of the Northern Song Dynasty - the shame of Jingkang was actually because the top emperors and officials at that time made a series of mistakes that even pigs would not make. For example, they did not guard when they should be defended and did not run when they should run. The Jin people did not rectify defense for several months before the second siege of the city, but instead derogated Li Gang and engaged in internal strife, and even naively began to liquidate historical issues (the so-called "no matter how Taiyuan is, but the Taixue is; no matter how safe it is, but the Spring and Autumn is, but the Spring and Autumn is, but the Anshi is; no matter how Su is, but the King Shu is; no matter how Yanshan is, but Nieshan is; no matter how Tokyo is, but Cai Jing is; no matter how

He was in charge of Hebei's territory, but he was in charge of Juren's resignation; he was in charge of Hedong, but Chen Dong; he was in charge of the second prince, but he was in charge of establishing the prince"); at the most critical moment of the second city defense battle, a group of Taoist priests went to the top of the city to jump to the top of the city; after the city was broken, the Jin people did not dare to go down to the outer city wall of Tokyo, but the emperor wanted to go to the Jin camp to personally surrender and went twice, but he was finally detained; the Jin soldiers broke the city and all forced the emperor to surrender, and the officials in power also carried out peacekeeping in Tokyo to suppress the people and soldiers who spontaneously organized anti-Jin. They also spared no effort to search for money and people for the Jurchens, and so on.

As for why the court at that time could gather such a group of stupid people to commit such a great death, if it really wanted to dig the roots, it would be traced back to the time when Emperor Shenzong destroyed the political system at that time in order to centralize power. In the early and mid-term institutional structures of the Northern Song Dynasty, the civil servant group had strong constraints on the power of the prime minister through channels such as strengthening the power of the prime minister and censors. The so-called "literati and officials and emperors rule the world together" was not a false statement at that time. To put it simply, the emperor at that time could not do whatever he wanted, and many things must be done by civil servants.

Only by group approval can it be implemented at the execution level. Such a decision-making mechanism will certainly suffer from efficiency, but it can also ensure more stability in the political situation and no big mistakes. However, in the Shenzong Dynasty, in order to implement reforms, Song Shenzong made many changes to the political systems left over from the previous dynasty (such as weakening the power of the prime minister, weakening the review of "Imperial Pen Reduction", that is, the emperor's decree, rejection mechanism, purge of censorship, and even indirect support, encouraging literary inquisition and party struggles), which greatly weakened these constraints. Then the impact of this change continued to

The Huizong Dynasty, and unfortunately, was far worse than that of the monarch and ministers of the Shenzong Dynasty. At that time, Cai Jing, the powerful minister who was favored by Song Huizong, followed the momentum of the reform of Shenzong, further strengthened the political effectiveness of Huizong's "Imperial Pen", so that decisions of all sizes and decisions were determined by the "super intention". Therefore, various collective decision-making mechanisms in the early and mid-stage Northern Song Dynasty were basically in name only; while Cai Jing himself took advantage of his own trust in Huizong, repeatedly used the "Imperial Pen" to promote his intentions, control the government, and continued to compare with the gods.

The Zong Dynasty had no bottom line and was even more outrageous party struggles and political purges (such as the famous "Yuanyou Party Ban"). This series of measures eventually led to the corruption of the talent selection mechanism of the Huizong Dynasty, and the small-scale party advances in the court. The ultimate upper-level bureaucratic group formed had neither the politeness and basic moral bottom line nor the strategic vision, so it was possible to bring together a bunch of weirdos. After the Jin soldiers headed south in the seventh year of Xuanhe (1126 AD), they repeatedly staged the joke-like farce mentioned above with the emperor, and eventually killed a wealthy country with soldiers and hearts.

The real reason for the demise of the Northern Song Dynasty was not that there was a problem with the system of the Northern Song Dynasty itself, but that it was that it failed to maintain the relatively good collective decision-making mechanism and political atmosphere in the early and mid-term periods. Among them, the later changes to the existing political system were too rash, and the decision-making mechanism that originally tended to collective decision-making was reversed back to the arbitrary path of the monarch; and after making a bad hole, it was further exploited by powerful officials such as Cai Jing, who were skilled and unfair, and eventually the top of the entire political system was rotten. Moreover,

This kind of bad thing is not reflected in the lack of action, but in the absence of restrictions, no reasonable and smooth criticism and error correction mechanism, so it is smooth (I would like to add here: In fact, a major feature of the politics of the Huizong Dynasty is that it is very good at winning the achievements. It has made a lot of contributions to the outside and the internal affairs in the early and mid-term. The battle between Dioceso Siluo (Hehuang area) and Xixia has also won many victories. If you continue to fight, it is likely to open up the Hexi Corridor - of course, this is the family fortune accumulated by previous generations of emperors, not Hui.

The results of the monarchy and ministers created by the monarchy are so smooth that they are smooth); but once there is a real crisis, the judgment of the top leaders is slightly worse, the entire system will collapse instantly like an avalanche. This is "collapse from the upper level". It is not caused by the ulceration of the base or the collapse caused by external pressure. It is not that there is not enough money, there is not enough soldiers to fight, nor that there is no talent, nor that there is no organizational mobilization ability and cohesion (see another example here: Bei during the Jingkang period

The Song Dynasty was besieged. In addition to the official army, there were many militias who spontaneously responded to the imperial edict. Many of them rushed from Jiangxi, Hunan and even Fujian to Tokyo. Considering the technical conditions and transportation conditions at that time, it was very good. It was a problem with the leadership group at the top of the system and the system. As for how the system was wrong, it was because of specific people. People themselves are very happy with achievements, eager to achieve success, short-sightedness, selfishness, and mutual infighting and mutual utilization between people.

The two major money-burning units in the Song Dynasty: officials and soldiers. In the Song Dynasty, as long as you enter the official system, no matter whether you are on duty, retired, unemployed or retired, you will have a lot of money to get. And many people are interested in talking about the high salary of officials in the Song Dynasty.

Let’s give an example to Bao Zheng’s salary: thirty stones of grain per month, including half of rice and wheat; twenty bundles of firewood (13 kilograms per bundle), forty bundles of hay; fifteen flakes (15 kilograms per bundle) of charcoal were distributed in winter; one thousand five hundred stags of "prime money" was distributed in monthly, and one hundred stags of "added money" was distributed in "1000 stags of money".

Bao Gong also has the title of direct bachelor of Longtu Pavilion. This additional 20 hectares of arable land (2,000 acres) of free allocated by the imperial court, allowed to collect rent and not pay state taxes. According to the budget of one stone of rice per mu, the input amount is 2,000 stones. Bao Gong's annual annual income is 2,0856 guan of copper coins, 2,180 guan of rice, 180 guan of wheat, 10 silk, 34 silk, 2,000 silk, 2,000 guan of silk, 10 taels of cotton, 15 taels of charcoal, 240 bales of firewood, and 480 bales of hay. If all these things are converted into copper coins according to the market price at that time, Bao Gong's annual income is about 21,878 guan.

An ordinary Song Dynasty person earns only about 250 guan a year. For Wu Dalang, who can marry a sister-in-law with a white American-gold, and who can buy a two-story villa on the main street of the county, this ability to make money cannot be underestimated.

In order to maintain social stability, the Song Dynasty raised the largest army in the world at that time. According to statistics, during the period of Renzong of the Northern Song Dynasty, the number of troops in the Song Dynasty reached 1.25 million, while Sima Guang mentioned in the Tianbao period when Emperor Xuanzong of Tang began to be powerful, the number of soldiers in the world was 490,000. This army occupied a large amount of social resources. Except for some border guard soldiers who fought on the border all year round, the overall military quality of most soldiers was quite poor.

During the reign of Emperor Renzong of Song Dynasty, these 1.25 million soldiers spent 48 million yuan, accounting for five-sixth of the national fiscal revenue.

The 1.25 million troops were stationed on the land bordering the northwest and Xixia, more than 300,000 were stationed on the border between Hebei and Liao, and more than 300,000 were the central imperial guards in the capital. The Northwest Army maintained strong combat effectiveness due to its strong folk customs in Shaanxi and its long-term war against Xia, so it maintained its strong combat effectiveness for a long time.

The army of the Northern Song Dynasty can be divided into three parts: imperial guards, xiang army and village soldiers, among which the combat effectiveness of the Xiang army and village soldiers is relatively weak. The Xiang army and village soldiers generally do some of the dirtiest and most tiring logistics support work.

The Northern Song government itself did not generate any income. All the expenses for officials and soldiers were derived from the taxes of the people. In other words, under the conditions of equality, the number and salary of the Song Dynasty officials increased, the number and military pay of the Song Dynasty increased, and the tax paid by the people increased accordingly.

The Song Dynasty government could not rely on the taxes of the people, after all, under the circumstances, this would not be too high. In fact, another major source of financial income in the Song Dynasty was state-owned enterprises all over the country. In addition to salt and iron, rice, oil, vinegar, tea, wine, cloth and other daily necessities adopted the state-owned strategy. Many of these things were of inferior quality and high price, which actually increased the living burden of the people. For example, during the Northern Song Dynasty, the green salt (salt shipped from Qinghai) ate only four or five cents per catty. Later, after the Northern Song Dynasty government monopolized the selling rights of green salt, the selling price of green salt rose to 44 cents. Salt is still the same, and other things are

It can be imagined that in the late Northern Song Dynasty, Wang Anshi's reform (this is a bit complicated, I will talk about it slowly) was unanimously opposed by the people of the whole country because Wang Anshi's economic policy further expanded the business scope of state-owned enterprises on this basis. For example, the Qingmiao Law actually made profits through loans, and the Market Change Law and the Equal Transfer Law were the state established a trading company to uniformly acquire and operate. These policies increased the burden on the people. He himself was a "skeleton man", and many things did not greet people. Every time he released it, he brought in some messy people during the implementation process, and the result was self-evident.

The economic prosperity of the Song Dynasty was quite similar to the former Soviet Union. The so-called economic development was indeed the case from the perspective of GDP alone, but it had lost the vitality to move forward. They were also extremely developed in military industries (the quality and quantity of arms in the Song Dynasty were recognized as high, and the "Wu Jing Zongyao" clearly described it). State-owned enterprises absolutely dominate and controlled the lifeline of the people. In the late Northern Song Dynasty, there were a large number of officials and extremely serious corruption. They maintained the largest standing army in the world, and military expenditures far exceeded people's livelihood expenditures. It will be a matter of time before such a dangerous country with a treacherous egg destruction.

Finally, let’s talk about the climate problem. During the third Little Ice Age (from the late 10th to the late 12th century), the average temperature dropped by 5 degrees Celsius, with ice, snow, heavy rain, and hail gradually increasing. Compared with floods, droughts often followed one after another. In some years, Taihu Lake located in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River was covered with thin ice, which is unimaginable. This will also lead to a series of natural disasters. According to historical records, the various disasters that broke out together were 2-3 times that of the Tang Dynasty. (If you are interested, you can check out "The Transformation of Harvard Chinese Historical Song Dynasty", but unfortunately "Cambridge Chinese Historical Song Dynasty" only has an English version, and there is also a "Kotanshe Song Dynasty")

The Yellow River's troubles: temperature fluctuates up and down, the Northern Song government neglected to dredge river channels, the silt and loess in the Yellow River (carried from the Ordos Plateau and Shaanxi by the river), the heavy load not only slowed down the flow rate of the river, but also piled up the riverbed, causing the river to rush over the embankment on the south bank and flooded the lowlands. In 1019, the river water washed over the embankment and broke into Huazhou Prefecture City on the north bank, forming a huge swamp in the eastern and western parts of the mountain. By chance, the rivers, lakes and swamps in the Liangshan area became the base camps of green forest heroes.

In the late Northern Song Dynasty, in the autumn of 1120, Fang La rebelled due to the disaster of Huashigang. Fang La used the Manichaeism (Ming Cult) to organize the people and held a massive uprising. Fang La was the real rebellion. Fang La was the real rebellion. The Northern Song Dynasty dropped all the Western Army, which was the most capable of fighting on the border, and there were problems within Fang La. The result was self-evident. In just five months, Fang La, who was the emperor in the south, was wiped out, but the Song Dynasty lost a total of 70,000 regular troops (I will focus on this history later).

In December 1119, Song Jiang gathered 36 people to revolt in the area north of the Yellow River under Jingdong East Road, specializing in fighting social injustice and killing the rich and helping the poor. Because the Song Dynasty army did not fight for a long time, lacked training and had extremely poor combat effectiveness; and because Song Jiang was "extraordinary", the 36 people under him were all powerful and brave men and heroes. Therefore, this expedition did not destroy the Song Jiang uprising army, but instead made him famous. In the following year

For many times, Song Jiang and others did not enter the 800-mile water-pooling Liangshan to replace the heavenly road as described in literary works such as "Water Margin", but instead "running Qi and Wei", and fought thousands of miles away from the area of ​​Shandong and Hebei. Song Jiang led his troops to attack Heshuo (generally referring to the north and south of the lower reaches of the Yellow River), Jingdong East Road (government in Qingzhou, now Yidu, Shandong Province), and fought in Qing, Qi (now Jinan, Shandong Province) to Puzhou (now north of Juancheng, Shandong Province), and captured ten

Yujun City (this is not available in "History of Song" and "The Three Dynasties Beimenghui"), punishing corrupt officials, killing the rich and helping the poor, and its momentum is growing. During the encirclement and blocking of tens of thousands of official troops, the rebel army captured the city and flexibly attacked the enemy. Although the number was not large, it was like a steel knife, which made the rulers change their qualities. "No official army dared to snatch its edge" and became a very influential peasant uprising team. Later, Zhang Shuye defeated Haizhou and was forced to recruit.

Song Jiang, the leader, naturally had no good ending. At the most, Song Jiang had only more than 200 people. After recruiting the people, these people were arrogant in the capital, leaving a good impression on the Tokyoites. The Tokyoites were bored, so they wrote some of the small things that were so small that they actually wrote them into stories. Later, they became the content of folk artists' rap, passed down from generation to generation, which led to the later "Water Margin".

The above is the official history. I have summarized some for you. There were naturally many peasant uprisings in the late Northern Song Dynasty, and I will talk about them one by one later.
Chapter completed!